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How much does public capital matter for economic growth? How large should it
be? This paper attempts to answer these questions, taking the case of SSA countries.
It develops and estimates a model that posits a nonlinear relationship between public
investment and growth, to determine the growth-maximizing public investment GDP
share. It empirically also accounts for the crowding-in and crowding-out e¤ects
between public and private investment, with equations estimated separately and
simultaneously, using System GMM. The paper further runs simulation and examines
the public investment GDP share that maximizes consumption. This is estimated
to be between 8:4 percent and 11:0 percent. The results from estimating the growth
model are in the middle of this range, which is larger than the observed value of 7:2
percent at the end of the sample period. These outcomes suggest that, on average,
there has been public under-investment in Africa, contrary to previous ndings.
JEL Classication: O4; H4
Keywords: Public investment; Economic Growth; Nonlinearity
Corresponding author: e-mail: t.ziesemer@maastrichtuniversity.nl; tel.: +31 43 3883872; fax: +31
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21. Introduction
The gap separating the worlds rich and poor countries remains startling. In 2007,
per-capita income in the United States was at least thirty times higher than in eigh-
teen Sub-Saharan African (SSA) countries.1 Compared to Ethiopia and Tanzania,
for instance, the United States has a per-capita income that is more than thirty-eight
and forty-six times larger, respectively, when measured in terms of purchasing power
parity. Put di¤erently, a typical individual in Tanzania has to work more than a
month and a half to earn what his counterpart in the United States earns in a day.
Di¤erences in economic growth rates compounded over long periods of time account
for these di¤erences. Fortunately, endogenous growth theory suggests that there is
something we can do about it.
One of the most important contributions of the newgrowth theory is the insight
into the role of scal policy in long-run growth. In his seminal contribution, Barro
(1990) argues that when the private rate of return of capital is lower than its social
rate, optimal allocation calls for further capital accumulation. In this case, public
investment becomes important for long-run growth. A vast theoretical literature on
endogenous growth underscores the importance of scal policy, in the form of public
capital ow and stock, for economic growth (e.g., Ziesemer, 1990, Futagami et al.,
1993, Glomm and Ravikumar, 1994, 1997, Turnovsky, 2000, Agenor et al., 2008).
Existing empirical evidence is mixed, however, due to mainly methodological and
model specication issues as well as due to di¤erences in samples. Recent esti-
mates of the elasticity of output with respect to public capital range from zero to
a value that is higher than the output elasticity of private capital, for instance.2
Fedderke and Bogetic (2009) presented ve reasons for the contradictory empirical
1Based on Penn World Table 6.3 (Heston et al., 2009).
2For instance, using cross country data, Canning (1999), Aschauer (2000b), and Demetriades and
Mamuneas (2000) estimate elasticity of output to be as large as that for private capital; Miller
and Tsoukis (2001) and Kamps (2005) estimate values below private capitals. On the other hand,
Milbourne et al. (2003) report insignicant e¤ects of public investment on growth and output. Using
country specic data, Everaert and Heylen (2004) and Fedderke et al. (2006) estimate elasticity
values of public capital, for Belgium and South Africa, respectively, from 0.3 to 0.5. Luoto (2011)
estimates about 0.1 for Finland.
3ndings: the presence of nonlinearity; crowding out e¤ect; endogeneity; an indirect
or complementarity e¤ect (rather than a direct productivity e¤ect); or problems of
aggregation. We address in this paper the rst four of these reasons while providing
a more comprehensive analysis of optimal public investment, with a focus on SSA
countries.
The issue of the optimal level of public investment is under-researched for SSA, as
much of the discussion in the literature has been on attracting private investment to
this region. However, Foster and Briceno-Garmendia (2010) argue that countries in
SSA lag behind their developing countriespeers in any measure of infrastructure.
According to these authors, there are in particular signicant di¤erences among SSA
and other low- and middle-income countries in terms of paved roads, telephone main-
lines, and power generation, with SSA possessing less than four, seven and eight times
the respective infrastructure units than their counterparts. The cost of infrastructure
service in SSA is, furthermore, twice more expensive than elsewhere. In contrast,
Devarajan et al. (2001, 2003) argue that most African countries have already pub-
lic over-investment, probably the result of creating rent-seeking opportunities. This
ambiguity is likely explained by the implied low qualityof public investment due to
ine¢ cient public allocation. However, as African governments seem to have improved
governance in the more recent period, it is expected that higher quality would now
accompany a given quantity of public investment.
Moreover, although the literature on the impact of public capital on economic
growth has grown voluminous in the past few decades, only very few studies have
addressed Africa (Ayogu, 2007). In particular, the issue of the growth-maximizing
levels of public capital for African economies is yet to be addressed, as existing studies
tend to employ linear models.3 Nonlinear models have been applied to other parts
3For instance, Fedderke et al. (2006) and Fedderke and Bogetic (2009) study the impact of in-
frastructure on growth for South Africa, and Ayogu (1999) for Nigeria. Calderon and Serven
(2008) and Calderon (2009), using large panel data sets covering over 100 countries, examine the
relationship between infrastructure assets and growth in SSA; Estache et al. (2005), applying an
augmented Solow model with infrastructure variables, and using pooled OLS study the relationship
for 41 SSA countries. Boopen (2006) studies the impact of transport infrastructure on economic
growth for SSA countries, using a dynamic panel model of Di¤erence GMM method. Devarajan
et al. (2001, 2003) examine the productivity of public investment in Africa employing 2SLS for a
4of the world, however.4
The relevant question for policy is not only whether public capital is productive,
that is, whether or not a unit increment on public capital stock increases output
or growth, but also whether public capital is overall growth-enhancing given that
it diverts resources from other activities (Romp and de Haan, 2007, Canning and
Pedroni, 2008). The reason is that public capital can have a negative as well as
a positive e¤ect on the economy. Even though an adequate and e¢ cient supply
of public capital promotes output and growth, the burden resulting from nancing
it may have an adverse e¤ect as well, such as crowding-out of private capital. A
highly enhanced transportation system, for instance, could improve the e¢ ciency of
trucks, but overly burdensome taxes to nance it could deter the accumulation of
these trucks (Aschauer, 1998). Should the private sector not receive a net advantage
from the infrastructure development, there would be no increase in output. It is this
phenomenon that mainly gives rise to the nonlinearity between public capital and
growth.
This paper rst develops a simple endogenous growth model in an overlapping-
generation framework. It then estimates the implied nonlinear relationship between
public investment and economic growth, resulting from a positive public investment
and a negative taxation e¤ect. The growth-maximizing level of public investment is
determined by employing various nonlinear estimation techniques to dynamic panel
data from SSA countries: System GMM, weighted least square (WLS), and seemingly
unrelated regression (SUR). All three methods are applied with xed e¤ects. Esti-
mation of dynamic panel models with xed e¤ects give consistent estimates implying
only a weak bias when there is a su¢ ciently long time period. Given the relatively
small sample in time dimension, however, we also estimate the growth model using
non-linear System GMM.5 In contrast, earlier studies that estimate the elasticity of
output of public capital in nonlinear models usually apply simple calibration (e.g.,
cross section of countries.
4For example, Aschauer (2000a) and Kamps (2005) examined the optimality of public capital in
the United States and European countries, respectively, while Miller and Tsoukis (2001) was on a
set of low and middle-income countries.
5Section 3 provides a detailed discussion of this phenomenon.
5Aschauer, 2000a, Miller and Tsoukis, 2001) or nonlinear least squares methods (e.g.,
Kamps, 2005), or that simply use cross-country analysis, which runs the risk of taking
into account only the short-term e¤ects (see Glomm and Ravikumar 1997).
Limiting the growth impact of public investment to its direct e¤ects may provide
a poor indicator of its importance in the economy. This is because public investment
is likely to a¤ect other important variables such as private investment. Moreover,
policy-induced changes of growth may in turn inuence population growth, for in-
stance, with further implications for growth. The current paper attempts to cap-
ture these indirect e¤ects through formulating and estimating a system of di¤erence
equations that account for the mutual interaction among growth, public and private
investments and population growth.
In addition to estimating the growth equation, we regress public investment on
private investment and conversely. We examine the crowding-in (complementarity)
and the crowding-out e¤ects, using interacting variables. We also treat population
growth endogenously and estimate an equation for it. All four equations are es-
timated separately and also together as a simultaneous equations system in order
to account for possible correlation across equations, using System GMM. Finally,
we run simulations to further examine the optimality issue with policy experiments
using coe¢ cient estimates from both the separate- and simultaneous-equations esti-
mations.
Among our ndings is that public investment has a positive e¤ect on growth. Per-
haps more interestingly, the growth maximizing public investment GDP percentages
is between 9:0 percent and 10:0 percent when applying separate and simultaneous
equations estimations, which is larger than the mean of the observed values 7:2
percent at the end of the sample period. Furthermore, from the policy simulation
experiment, the sum of the discounted future consumption is maximized when there
is an increase in the public investment GDP share in 2015, from 7:2 percent to values
between 8:4 percent and 11:0 percent, depending on the discount rate, the acceler-
ator, complementarity and crowding-out e¤ects. When estimates are used from the
simultaneous equations regression, the complementarity is much stronger and leads
to a value of 11:0 percent (at 4 percent discount rate), for instance.
6We organize the rest of the paper as follows. In Section 2, we provide the theoret-
ical model. Sections 3 and 4 present the empirical estimation and the simulations,
respectively. Section 5 contains the conclusion.
2. Theoretical model
In neoclassical growth models, exogenous technical progress is the source of long-
run growth, leaving no room for policy decisions to have long-term e¤ects on economic
growth. Therefore, a shock to the public policy variable will have a transitory e¤ect
on the economy, a¤ecting only the level of (long-run) output. By contrast, in en-
dogenous growth models, policies may have a lasting impact on growth rates. Hence,
in these models, a shock to public capital may inuence both the long-run growth
rate and the output level.
In this section, we develop a simple endogenous growth model in an overlapping-
generations framework where agents live two periods. The model will form the basis
for the empirical analysis in a later section of the paper. Our model allows for the
capital stock to be long-lasting, even with a zero depreciation cost. In contrast to
standard models (see, for e.g., Barro, 1990, Futagami et. al., 1993, Glomm and
Ravikumar, 1994, 1997, Turnovsky, 2000, 2004), aggregate capital may depreciate
nonlinearly. Capital is assumed to be heterogeneous, so that current investment may
not add to the existing stock on a one-to-one basis.6 Therefore, the model also allows
adjustment cost associated with new investment in the spirit of Lucas and Prescott
(1971) and Basu (1987).7 The model explicitly captures the nonlinear relationship
between both the ow and the stock of public capital and economic growth, and
their respective growth maximizing levels are derived.
6For instance, in the case of public capital, the existing aggregate capital stock consists of past
investment in electricity, telecommunication, roads, etc.
7However, these bodies of literature do not focus on public capital and growth.
72.1. The model
Consumers
We use an overlapping-generations model with logarithmic preferences and tech-
nologies of a representative agent, as in Glomm and Ravikumar (1997). When young,
that is, during the rst period of life, the individual is endowed with a unit of labor,
which she supplies to the representative rm inelastically. Her income is equal to the
wage income (wt) . The government taxes this income at a xed at rate tax ( ),
in order to nance public investment. The individual allocates after-tax income be-
tween current consumption (ct) and saving (skt ). When she is old, she consumes (ct+1)
what she has saved in the previous period plus the after-tax return from saving.8
u (ct; ct+1) = ln ct +  ln ct+1 (1)
ct + s
k
t = (1   )wt (2)
ct+1 = (1 + rt (1   )) skt (3)
where rt is the interest rate, net of the depreciation and the adjustment costs of
capital. Private capital is accumulated according to the following equation,
kt+1 = B (kt)
1   kt (1  ) + skt   (4)
where ,  and kt represent the depreciation cost, the adjustment cost and the private
capital stock, respectively. Therefore, the model explicitly allows installation cost
for new investment and depreciation cost. When  = 0, adjustment cost is too high
to change both private and public capital. But when  = 1, adjustment cost is zero,
and capital stocks are accumulated according to the perpetual inventory method
8The model is kept simple for sake of tractability and technicality. For instance, population growth
is set to zero, as it could result in scaling e¤ects in growth. The applications of log-linear preference
and production function, and xed at-rate taxes on income and capital (in contrast to alternative
nancing methods) serve to obtain a tractable solution.
8(e.g., kt+1 = kt (1  ) + skt if B = 1). When  2 (0; 1), adjustment cost is di¤erent
from zero. Current investment adds to the stock of capital after adjustment made
for installation costs.
Government
The government budget is always balanced and given by,
sgt = yt (5)
where sgt and yt, are public investment and aggregate income, respectively.
The public capital accumulation equation is given by,
Gt+1 = B (Gt)
1  (Gt (1  ) + sgt )  (6)
Similar to (4),  and  are the depreciation rate and the adjustment cost associated
to the public capital stock (Gt).9
Firms
The production function of the representative rm has the Cobb-Douglas form:
yt = A (Gt)
 (kt)
1  (7)
where yt denotes output. There is no population growth, and labor is standardized
to be unity (lt = 1).
The rm maximizes prot within a competitive economy setting, taking prices and
9We set similar technological parameters for public and private capital in order to avoid unneces-
sarily complicating the model.
9public capital as given,
max
kt

A (Gt)
 (kt)
1    wt  Rtkt
	
(8)
where Rt denotes the cost of capital, including a rental price or interest for a unit
of capital paid to households (rt) and adjustment and depreciation costs. The rst-
order condition for prot maximization thus gives,
Rt = (1  )A (Gt) (kt)  (9)
And, the zero-prot condition in the competitive economy leads to the wage rate,
wt = A (Gt)
 (kt)
1  (10)
Competitive equilibrium
The representative household of period t solves the following problem, obtained
by substituting (2) and (3) into (1),
max
skt

ln
 
(1   )wt   skt

+  ln (1 + (1   )rt) skt
	
(11)
taking prices as given. The optimization yields,
skt = (1   )wt= (1 + ) (12)
Eq. (12) shows the agents optimal saving as a function of her wage income.
Dividing both sides by (yt), and using (5) and (10), one obtains
10
skt =yt = (1  sgt=yt)= (1 + ) (13)
Thus, eqs. (12) and (13) capture the crowding-out e¤ect of the public variable
through taxation.
Capital dynamics and growth
We get the dynamics of the private capital stock, rst by substituting eq. (12)
into eq. (4), and using (10),
kt+1 = Bkt (1  + A(1   ) (Gt=kt)) (14)
where   = (1 + ).
The di¤erence equation for the public capital stock is computed, by substituting
(5) into (6), and using (7), as:
Gt+1 = BGt
 
1  + A (Gt=kt) 1

(15)
Equations (14) and (15) characterize the dynamics of the economy during the
transition. They explicitly demonstrate complementarities among public and pri-
vate capital. On the other hand, (14) captures the crowding-out e¤ect of public
investment, through a negative relationship between taxation ( ) and private capi-
tal accumulation (kt+1).
From (14) and (15), we obtain the following di¤erence equation for the public-
private capital ratio,
Gt+1=kt+1 = (Gt=kt)
  
1  + A (Gt=kt) 1

= (1  + A(1   ) (Gt=kt))

(16)
11
The log-linearized version of eq. (16) is shown to be stable in Appendix A.
On the balanced growth path, considering (16), the public-private capital stock
ratio is constant:
G=k =  = ((1   )) (17)
Also, from (7), y=k is constant. Therefore, the capital stocks and output grow at the
same rate y:
y = ln (Gt+1=Gt) = ln (kt+1=kt) = ln (yt+1=yt) (18)
Growth maximizing public capital stock and ow
Using (14), y is easily computed,
y = lnB +  ln (1  + A(1   ) (Gt=kt)) (19)
Solving for  from (17) and substituting the result into (19), we obtain
y = lnB +  ln (1  + A (G=k) = ( (G=k) + 1)) (20)
Eq. (20) represents the growth rate of the economy as a function of the steady-
state public-private capital stock ratio G=k. The last term captures the nonlinear
relationship between economic growth and the public-private capital ratio.
The public-private capital stock ratio ((G=k)) that maximizes the growth rate
(20) is,
(G=k) = (1 + ) = ((1  )) (21)
12
With regard to the ow of public capital (public investment), we substitute (17) into
(19), and use (5) to replace the tax rate, and obtain
y = lnB +  ln
 
1  + A1 (1  sgt=y)1  (sgt=y)

(22)
Eq. (22) shows the growth rate of the economy as a function of the public investment-
output ratio (sg=y). Maximizing it with respect to sg=y, we get the following familiar
result,
(sg=y) =  (23)
Therefore, (23) is the growth-maximizing productive government expenditure, which
balances the negative taxation and the positive productive e¤ects of public invest-
ment on the economy, as does the stock of public capital in eq. (20). This is also
the optimal public investment when  = 1 and  = 1 (see, for e.g., Barro, 1990 and
Futagami et al., 1993).
Both (22) and (23) will be referred to in the next section for empirical estimation.
3. Estimation
This section empirically examines the nonlinear relationship between the ow of
public capital (public investment) and growth using panel data from SSA coun-
tries, as data on public capital stock are often limited and unreliable.10 It also
analyzes complementarities and cowding-out e¤ects between public and private in-
vestment. We estimate not only the growth model of Section 2 but also a system
of di¤erence equations involving population growth and economic growth, as well as
public investment and private investment. Estimations of equations are conducted
both separately and simultaneously using various econometric techniques, including
10Construction of public capital stock data depends on rather arbitrary assumptions about depre-
ciation and initial capital stock.
13
nonlinear System GMM, seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) and weighted least
squares (WLS).
The rst estimation equation is a growth equation, based on (22), that regresses
per capita GDP growth on public investment and other control variables (lagged
dependent variable, private investment, and population growth). The second and
third estimation equations characterize the dynamics of the capital ows. The
fourth is a population growth equation that regresses population growth on lagged
population growth and GDP per capita variables. The growth estimation yields
the growth-maximizing level of public investment. We compare this estimate with
a consumption-maximizing level of public investment from simulating a system of
macroeconomic dynamics with the four di¤erence equations that captures the mu-
tual interaction among public investment, private investment, population growth,
and economic growth.
The panel data used in the study cover 33 SSA countries, mainly, for the period
1967 to 2008.11 Table 1 provides summary statistics, denitions and data sources of
the variables used in the estimation. The average public investment of these countries
over the specied period is 7.1 percent of real GDP while the average growth rate of
real GDP per capita is 0.8 percent.
TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE
3.1. Econometric Methods
We estimate the dynamic panel equations, rst, separately using System GMM
and, second, together, as a simultaneous equations system using WLS, SUR and
System GMM. All methods include xed e¤ects. Although xed e¤ects estimations
of dynamic panel data are biased, the bias approaches zero for a large time-dimension
sample size (Bond, 2002). As a general rule, the xed e¤ects bias is of order 1=T ,
where T represents time-dimension. Thus, it is su¢ ciently small for T = 30 or more
11Countries are included in the study based on the availability of relatively reliable data. These
are: Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad,
Congo, Dem. Rep., Congo, Rep., Cote dIvoire, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, The Gambia, Ghana,
Guinea, Kenya, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra
Leone, South Africa, Sudan, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.
14
(see, for e.g., Judson and Owen, 1999, Baltagi, 2008, Ch.8). In our data, the time
dimension T could be as little as 21 years, based on the average of 700 observations
for 33 countries.12 Hence the xed e¤ects estimates could su¤er from a downward
bias in the coe¢ cient of the lagged dependent variable. The coe¢ cient of the public
investment variable may also be a¤ected then.
We, therefore, also present nonlinear estimates based on the System GMMmethod.
The System GMM version uses one equation in rst di¤erences with lagged levels as
instruments and one within-groups estimator equation in levels using lagged rst dif-
ferences as instruments. The coe¢ cients of the two equations then are restricted to
be the same for the level variables and their counterparts in the rst di¤erence equa-
tion. Alternatively, the rst di¤erence equation could be replaced by the Arellano
and Bover (1995) method of orthogonal deviations. Implementation of non-linear
items is more easily tractable in the rst di¤erence version of System GMM given
the complexity of the orthogonal deviation model. On the other hand, the orthogonal
deviation method has the advantage of losing fewer observations in case of missing
values (Roodman, 2006).
3.2. Separate equations estimations with System GMM
3.2.1. Growth equation
We now estimate the possible nonlinear relationship between the ow of public
capital and growth using panel data from SSA countries based on equations from
the model developed in Section 2. First, we employ eq. (22),13 with standard control
variables - lagged dependent variable, lagged private investment as a share of GDP,
population growth rate and time trend - to determine whether there exists a nonlinear
relationship between public investment and growth. Then, we obtain an estimate for
the output elasticity of public capital (). Finally, we use the estimated value for 
and eq. (23), in order to obtain the growth-maximizing rate of public investment,
which can then be compared to the existing value of the panel average at the end of
12From the panel period 1967-2008 in the data, the maximum time period is 41 years; however, due
to missing data, the e¤ective time period averages 21 years.
13We only consider the case when there is complete depreciation of capital and zero adjustment
cost,  = 1 and  = 1.
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the period and/or a result from a simulation analysis.
We thus rewrite (22) (with no adjustment cost and complete depreciation), includ-
ing control variables and error terms, in a panel form:
 
y

it
= mit + axit j + ei + uit (24)
where
 
y

it
= ln yit   ln yit 1; ei and uit denote the xed e¤ects and error terms,
respectively;
 
y

it
and xit j represent growth rates of GDP per capita and a vector of
control variables, respectively; and, mit stands for the function of public investment
as a share of GDP, which has a nonlinear relationship with growth rate of GDP per
capita (22):
mit = ln
 
(1  (sg=y)it)1  ((sg=y)it)

(25)
We use eq. (24) to estimate  and a applying nonlinear regression methods. The
standard formulation for our growth regression, an elaborated formulation of (24),
then is as follows:
ln (yit) = a1 ln (yit 1) + (1  ) ln (1  (sg=y)it) +  ln ((sg=y)it)
+a2 ln
 
sk=y

it 1 + a3
 
p
2
it
+ a4 t + ei + uit (26)
where
 
p
2
it
and  t denote the square of population growth and time, respectively.
Eq. (26) shows a dynamic panel data model, where we have rewritten (24) with
growth expressed di¤erence in log income levels and have dened the control variables
explicitly.14
We rst estimate (26) separately using the rst di¤erence approach to System
14Absence of the control variables (and a1 = 1), (26) reduces to the special case (22) with  = 1
and  = 1.
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GMM.15 The result is as follows (t-values in parentheses):16
ln (yit) = 0:942
(47:1)
ln (yit 1) + 0:902
(7:06)
ln (1  (sg=y)it) + : 098
(7:06)
ln ((sg=y)it)
+0:029
(2:04)
ln
 
sk=y

it 1   22:5( 8:5)
 
p
2
it
+ 0:001
(1:65)
 t + ei + uit (260)
The coe¢ cient for the lagged dependent variable is signicant, and at 0:94 it
indicates the persistency of output. The coe¢ cient of the time trend variable is also
positive and signicant. The nonlinear coe¢ cient estimate of public investment, 
the growth maximizing level of public investment as denoted by  in the theoretical
model, is thus estimated at 0:098. This result suggests, then, the need to increase
public investment, as percent of GDP, from its 7:2 percent level at the end of the
sample period to 9:8 percent. The coe¢ cient for private investment share is 2:9
percent and is also signicant. The population growth rate is signicant in its squared
form and has a negative coe¢ cient, in line with growth theory. The Sargan p-value
of 0:27 is close to the interval of 5 percent to 25 percent as suggested by Roodman
(2009). Note that our 9:8 percent estimate of the optimal level of public investment
is, in general, smaller than most of those in the recent literature (see Section 1).
3.2.2. Private investment equation
Public investment is believed to have both complementary and crowding-out e¤ects
on private investment. In the growth model, eqs. (12) and (13) show that public
investment crowds out private investment, as the tax used to nance it distorts
private saving. Eqs. (14) and (15), on the other hand, capture complementarities
between the stock variables.17
Our second estimation equation is a regression of private investment on public
investment, both as shares of GDP. We set up the model intended to empirically
determine the net e¤ects of crowding-in and crowding-out of public investment. We
15We use GMM-HAC (GMM cum heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard er-
rors). The econometric formulation of the systems GMM approach and the list of instruments are
found in the technical appendix, in the working paper version of this paper.
16This result also appears in the rst column of Table 2, equation I.
17By construction, eq. (7) implies that increasing public capital (for a given private capital) en-
hances the productivity of private capital and conversely.
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thus include an interaction variable that is useful to empirically examine comple-
mentarities among the investment variables.18
For estimation, we use System GMM in its orthogonal deviation variant by Arel-
lano and Bover (1995):
ln
 
sk=y

it
= b1 ln
 
sk=y

it 1 + b2 ln (s
g=y)it 2 + b3
 
y

it 1
+b4

ln
 
sk=y

it 2  ln (sg=y)it 1

+ ei + uit (27)
The rst term of equation (27) denotes lagged private investment while the second
represents two-periods lagged public investment, which captures the crowding-out
e¤ect in the spirit of eq. (13).19 The third, one-period lagged GDP per capita
growth rate, captures the accelerator mechanism; higher lagged growth is expected
to lead to a higher level of current investment. The fourth term is the interaction
variable, which consists of the rst and the second lags of public and private in-
vestment, respectively. The e¤ect of public investment is higher (in the case of a
positive coe¢ cient) if private investment in the previous period was higher implying
complementarity. It thus captures complementarity beyond the log linear structure
of the theoretical model, a step also known as leading to a translog function.
The estimation results are shown in column 1 of Table 2 under equation II. The
coe¢ cient for the two-period lagged public investment is  0:125 whereas the coe¢ -
cient of the interaction variable is 0:057. Both are signicant at the 1 percent level.
Therefore, public investment has both crowding-out and complementarity e¤ects.
As the log of the private investment share is in the order of magnitude of about
two, the positive complementarity e¤ect and the crowding-out e¤ect of public on
private investment are similar in order of magnitude, with slight dominance of the
complementarity e¤ect.20
18The growth model (in Section 2) does not feature such phenomena due to the particular production
functional form adopted. However, note that the application of standard production functions is
justied technically, as they are well-behaved and, often, provide tractable solutions.
19Lagged values of variables are often used as explanatory variables in the literature of dynamic
panel data and growth (see, e.g., Arellano and Bond, 1991, Bond et al., 2010). This is intuitive as
it may take some time before certain macroeconomic variables have e¤ects on the economy.
20Cavallo and Daude (2011) nd a negative e¤ect of public investment, but they do not use inter-
18
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3.2.3. Public investment equation
Our third estimation equation treats public investment as the dependent variable
where the lags of public, private and growth rates are the independent variables.
This formulation is in consideration of policy responses. Policy makers often react to
changes in macroeconomic variables. For instance, an increase in private investment
or stronger growth may lead to a change in public investment policy.
Similar to the previous equations we formulate and estimate the public investment
equation using ow variables and with a more general specication that includes an
interaction term.
ln (sg=y)it = c1 ln (s
g=y)it 1 + c2 ln
 
sk=y

it 1 + c3 ln
 
sk=y

it 2 + c4
 
y

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
ln
 
sk=y

it 2  ln (sg=y)it 1

+ ei + uit (28)
We estimate equation (28) using the orthogonal deviation method of Arellano and
Bover (1995) for System GMM. The results are presented in column 1, Table 2, under
equation III. Government action is weakly self-perpetuating, as indicated by the low
coe¢ cient for the lagged dependent variable of 0:38. Lagged private investment has
a net negative e¤ect on public investment as the negative coe¢ cient of the second lag
dominates the positive coe¢ cient of the rst lag. Productive government spending
partly complements private investment as shown in the interaction-term coe¢ cient
of 0:16. Finally, GDP per capita growth, lagged two years, has a positive impact.
For the equations (26), (27) and (28), the bottom part of Table 2 shows that
the second-order serial correlation is very low, in particular the coe¢ cient is below
0:2, making the Sargan p-value the relevant statistic for judging the validity of the
instruments (see Roodman, 2006). The Sargan p-values are indeed in, or close to,
the interval of 5 to 25 percent as recommended by Roodman (2009). Whenever there
is more than one instrument per regressor, we have applied a Sargan di¤erence test
(not reported) to verify that again the values are in the relevant interval of 5 and 25
percent.
action terms.
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3.2.4. Population growth equation
Our fourth estimation equation is a population growth equation. Recall that we
want to run simulations of a system that characterizes the macroeconomic dynamics
of the economy in order to further examine the optimal public investment, and also
analyze its e¤ects on the economy. So far we have three equations (eqs. (26), (27)
and (28)) but four variables (income, public and private investment and population
growth).
The fourth equation is:
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it 8 + d6 ln yit 2 + d7 ln yit 3 + d8 ln yit 5 + ei + uit (29)
The data used for estimating (29) have more than thirty observations per country.
Thus, the xed e¤ects bias is su¢ ciently small. Therefore, we estimate it with xed
e¤ects, using lagged levels as instruments, while taking into account the period-
SUR version of panel corrected standard errors (PCSE) similar to (27) and (28).
The results appear also in column 1 of Table 2 under equation IV. The coe¢ cients
of lagged values of population growth sum up to about 0:96.21 Although the third-
lagged income coe¢ cient is positive, the coe¢ cients of the second and fth lagged are
negative; in addition, the sum of all lagged income coe¢ cients is negative suggesting
the standard demographic transition.
21Some lagged variables are dropped due to collinearity and insignicance. Panel unit root tests
for population growth and income do not deliver clear-cut results, as is typical of cases of near-unit
roots. We use the residuals from regression of equation (29) to run panel unit root tests. The unit
root hypothesis is always rejected, indicating co-integration of the variables in the equation. Using
the Breusch-Godfrey test for serial correlation in the presence of endogeneity, we have also re-run
the regression with lagged residuals added to the regression. The lagged residuals turn out to be
insignicant, indicating an absence of serial correlation and of the corresponding potential bias in
the coe¢ cients.
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3.3. A simultaneous equation system with System GMM
We estimate eqs. (26), (27), (28) and (29) as a simultaneous equations system
as well. We rst estimate it using the WLS method where the reciprocals of the
variances of the residuals from least squares are employed as weights. Then, to ac-
count for possible correlations across equations, we also estimate the system using the
SUR method. Finally, in order to deal with both endogeneity and contemporaneous
correlation, we use System GMM.
In the latter case, we set up the system in which we write each of the rst three
equations as a System GMM estimator model, in rst-di¤erences, and the fourth
equation as a within-groups estimator (xed-e¤ects) model. This approach combines
the strength of the SUR estimator, taking into account relations between the residuals
of the equations, and that of the System GMM estimator, taking into account xed
e¤ects and endogeneity without imposing a normality assumption on the residuals.
The results for the WLS and the SUR methods are reported in columns 2 and 3 of
Table 2, respectively. Column 4 reports results from the GMM-HAC.22 Coe¢ cient
estimates for the public investment variable, in the growth equation, using WLS and
SUR, are lower than those from the GMM methods. Coe¢ cients estimate for private
investment and population growth variables are also lower.
Across the four approaches, in Table 2, all coe¢ cients have the same sign and are
signicant mostly at the 1 percent level. They di¤er slightly in magnitude, though.
For instance, in the growth regression, the coe¢ cient of public investment is lowest,
about 6:3 percent, in the non-instrumented models (WLS and SUR of columns 2 and
3). It is highest, about 9:8 percent, in the separate equations System GMM estima-
tion (column 1), and it is about 9:3 percent when the System GMM simultaneous
equations estimation is used (column 4). Private investment and population growth
e¤ects are also found to be stronger in the GMM estimations. In all cases we have
a signicantly positive time trend, suggesting positive long-run growth.
Comparing the GMM estimates, in the private investment estimation equation,
22The instruments used for the GMM-HAC procedure are presented in the technical appendix of
the working paper version of the paper. Again whenever there is more than one instrument per
regressor we have applied the Sargan di¤erence test to ensure that p-values are in or close to the
interval (5%, 25%).
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(equation II of Table 2), most coe¢ cients are larger in absolute terms in the simul-
taneous GMM estimations; in particular, the accelerator e¤ect is strong here. The
complementarity e¤ect relative to the crowding out e¤ect is larger in the simultane-
ous equation system than under separate GMM estimation. As we will see soon, this
will have an implication to the optimal level of public investment derived from the
policy experiments conducted in the next section. In the public investment equation,
coe¢ cients do not seem that di¤erent across GMM models.23
4. Simulations
In this section, we simulate the system of four equations ((26), (27), (28) and
(29)) and conduct policy experiment in order to determine the public investment
GDP share that maximizes discounted consumption and assess the e¤ects on in-
vestment, net income, and consumption. Parameter coe¢ cients of the variables are
estimates from the GMM-HAC regressions in column 4 of Table 2.24 Initial values
are constructed from regressing the variables on linear-quadratic time trends, in the
rst ve to ten years period. First, we simulate a benchmark economy with values
that (roughly) match with the panel average of real economies of SSA, particularly
during the end of the sample period.25 Then, we examine two types of experiments: a
one-time percentage shock to public investment, and an increase to a certain constant
level of public investment.
4.1. The benchmark economy
The result of the benchmark simulation is shown in Figure 1. Population growth
rst increases and then decreases. The GDP per capita growth rate increases until
1966 and then starts falling, in particular during the 1970s through the oil crises and
in the 1980s through the Latin American debt crisis, both of which hit SSA severely
23For equations II and III of Table 2, the panel corrected standard errors in column 1 are very close
to the conventional standard errors in column 4.
24Later on, we conduct sensitivity analysis using coe¢ cient estimates from the separate equation
estimation (column 1 of Table).
25The simulation starts in 1960 when the earliest data are available for the estimation of the
quadratic time trends. It ends in 3431 just before population growth becomes negative.
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and led to a lost decade(Greene, 1989, Humphreys and Underwood, 1989). During
the 1982 crisis public investment grows more quickly than GDP and therefore the
public investment GDP ratio has a small peak. Part of it goes only into the residuals
of our equations because the actual growth rates were slightly lower during the 1982
crisis. After the crisis, growth resumes, and more strongly so after 1990. It is well
known that much of this is due to higher natural resource prices, which may also
lead to high growth rates in the long run.
FIGURE 1 OVER HERE
The shares of public and private investment are about 7:5 and 14:3 percent, re-
spectively, at the end of the simulation period. The largest values of the public
and private shares of GDP, about 7:6 percent and 14:5 percent, are reached in 2080
and 2082, respectively. Population growth approaches zero (but very slowly) at the
end of the simulation period.26 For all variables the simulation values at the end of
the sample period are quite close to those of the actual panel average for 2005-2007
presented in the last column of Table 1.
4.2. Counterfactual analysis: Is public investment optimal in SSA coun-
tries?
From Table 1, the actual panel-average of public investment is 7:1 percent of real
GDP. At the end of the sample period, 2005-2007, the value is 7:2 percent (see Table
1, last column). According to the benchmark simulation it goes up to 7:56 percent
where it is from 2060-2110. However, the public investment that maximizes the
growth rate from the nonlinear growth regression, in Table 2 column 4 (or column1),
is 9:3 percent of GDP (or 9:8 percent). These results imply that on average the
public investment share of output in SSA countries is sub-optimal.
To further examine this with policy experiments, consider, rst, a one-time increase
in public investment in the year 2015 that boosts per capita consumption and net
income. Figures 2 and 3 show that the maximum feasible policy increase that can
be made is much below 2 percent. Adding a one-time 1:8 percent or stronger shock
26There is no steady state as population growth rate keeps changing.
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in the year 2015 to the public investment equation makes the model unstable. The
interactions between private and public investment are too strong with this shock
that make public and private investment to explode and, through taxation and non-
linearity in the growth equation, growth to implode after the year 2500 (see Figure
2). However, if we limit the shock to a one-time 1:79 percent, the e¤ect is to increase
the GDP per capita and the after-tax per capita income by about 30 percent and
per capita consumption by up to 23 percent (see Figure 3a). Public and private
investment shares with this shock go slightly beyond 20 percent above the benchmark
values for a long period (see Figure 3b) with a peak reached around 2290, indicating
that stability is ensured.
FIGURE 2 OVER HERE
FIGURE 3 OVER HERE
Our second policy experiment is to nd rather the constant level of the public
investment that maximizes the sum of per capita consumption (discounted at 4
percent), from 2015 to 3430. On the basis of the simultaneous equations regression
in column 4 of Table 2, this value, as share of GDP, is 11 percent.27 The results are
plotted in Figure 4. The value for the growth rate returns to its benchmark value in
the year 2166. The fall in the population growth rate is speeded up slightly but is
about 97 percent of the benchmark value after a long period of time. The increases
relative to the benchmark are about 39 percent for consumption, 46 percent for
public investment shares, 64 percent for after-tax income, 70 percent for GDP per
capita, and 75 percent for the share of private investment. These values may seem
large; however, they are reached only after a long period of time (more than hundred
years).
FIGURE 4 OVER HERE
4.2.1. Sensitivity analysis
We also run the simulation using the estimates from the separate equations es-
timation (column 1 of Table 2). The simulation results are shown in Figure 5. A
27Sensitivity analysis for discount rates of 8 percent and 12 percent yields about 9:3 percent and
8:4 percent optimal public investment, respectively (see Table 3).
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relatively lower value of 9:12 percent of public investment (as a share of GDP) max-
imizes the sum of per capita consumption (discounted at 4 percent). The outcomes
are much smaller than the ones we get from the 11 percent increase in the previous
simulation. For instance, public investment is raised by only 25 percent from its
benchmark value of 7:5 percent, in contrast to the 46 percent rise earlier; GDP per
capita by about 8:4 percent; both after- tax income and consumption per capita by
about 5:6 percent; and, private investment by only about 1:7 percent, in contrast to
the 75 percent rise earlier.
FIGURE 5 OVER HERE
The di¤erence in the simulationsoutcomes is apparently due to di¤erences in the
estimates of the variables, which in turn depend on the estimation methods employed.
Which of the latter are more plausible? Both methods have their own merits. The
advantages of the simultaneous equations estimation vis-à-vis the separate is similar
to that of the SUR estimation. It takes into account the contemporaneous correlation.
However, the orthogonal deviation method used in the separate equation estimation
has the advantage of losing fewer observations than rst-di¤erences.
In the simultaneous equations estimation, the accelerator, and net complementar-
ity e¤ects are much stronger compared to the separate-equations estimation. This
leads to di¤erences in the simulation outcome. However, note that, although the
values for optimal public investment di¤er from each other to some extent, they are
all larger than the value of 7:2 percent, which the current data have for the end of
the sample period. In addition, they are much smaller than the values, which were
reported, by earlier works, for other areas. For instance, Aschauers (2000a) esti-
mate of the growth maximizing level of public capital for the US is about 30 percent;
Miller and Tsoukiss (2001) for a wide range of low and middle income countries is
18 percent; Kampss (2005) for European and OECD countries is 20 percent.
We also perform sensitivity analysis for using di¤erent values of discount rates.
Table 3 presents simulation results related to 8 percent and 12 percent discount
rates, in addition to the results of using 4 percent discount rate that we discussed
earlier.
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In general, the optimal public investment shares decrease at discount rates. The
optimal public investment shares that correspond to 4 percent, 8 percent and 12
percent discount rates under the simultaneous equations estimation, for instance,
are 11 percent, 9:3 percent and 8:4 percent, respectively. The gap is much smaller
under the separate equation estimation. However, note that even at a discount rate
of 12 percent the optimal public investment rate in both simulations is about 8:4
percent, which is still higher than the actual end-of-panel average value, 7:2 percent.
As the strong e¤ects of higher public investment in the simultaneous estimation
model stem from the mutual reinforcement of public and private investment and
the accelerator e¤ect of GDP per capita growth and therefore arrive in the later
years, higher discount rates also reduce the discrepancies of the e¤ects from the two
estimation methods.
5. Conclusion
Economists have long acknowledged the importance of public investment. Many
believe public investment enhances productivity and complements private invest-
ment, with a positive impact on long-run growth and welfare. Others argue that
the higher taxation, for instance, resulting from the larger public investment, lowers
growth and welfare as it distorts private saving and e¤orts. Thus, the relationship
between long-run growth and public investment could be non-monotonic, with the
likelihood of an optimal level of public investment.
The present paper rst developed an endogenous growth model that posited non-
linearity in the public capital and growth relationship in SSA countries. Using the
panel data from SSA countries, from 1967 to 2008, and applying various economet-
ric techniques, it estimated the model and identied the growth-maximizing level of
public investment in the region. It has found that not only does public investment
highly matter for economic growth but also that the current level prevailing in SSA is,
on average, sub-optimal. Applying separate and simultaneous equations estimation
methodologies, we found growth maximizing public investment GDP percentages of
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between 9.0 percent and 10.0 percent.
An important aspect of public investment is its indirect impact on growth through
an e¤ect on private investment, and conversely. To shed light on this phenomenon,
we formulated a system of di¤erence equations that captured the relationships among
growth, public and private investment and population growth, and conducted esti-
mation both separately and simultaneously using various econometric techniques.
Both complementarities and crowding-out e¤ects were detected between public and
private investments while accelerator and net complementarity e¤ects were found
to be stronger under the simultaneous equations estimation. Applying the estimates
from these regressions we then ran simulations to determine the level of public invest-
ment that maximizes the sum of discounted consumption. The optimal value was
computed to be between 8.4 percent and 11.0 percent, when using discount rates
ranging from 4 percent to 12 percent, respectively. The results from estimating the
growth model are thus in the middle of this range. These values are larger than the
observed value of 7.2 percent at the end of the sample period. The present ndings
are, therefore, not in concert with the previous nding of public over-investment in
the region. Our estimates are, nevertheless, generally much lower than those for
other regions and country groups.
A. Appendix
Stability of the capital ratio dynamics
To examine the stability of (16), rst rewrite it, using (17), as:
(Gt+1=kt+1)
1
 (1  ) = (A ) + (Gt+1=kt+1)
1
 (Gt=kt)
 (G=k) 1
= (1  ) = (A ) (Gt=kt)
1
 + (Gt=kt)
 1+ 1
 (A.1)
Then, log-linearize (A.1) near the steady-state capital ratio (G=k), (see Novales,
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et al. 2010), to obtain
zt+1  zt (A.2)
where zt  ln (Gt=kt)  ln (G=k) and
  1  ((1   )= )
1 
1

 
(1  ) = (A ) + ((1   )= )1  (A.3)
Thus, the root of the log-linearized eq. (A.2) is stable as long as 0 <  < 1, which
is the case since the denominator of the second term of (A.3) is greater than the
nominator while both are positive.
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Table 1
Summary statistics for 33 SSA countries over the period 1967-2008
Variable Mean Standard Deviation Min Max Mean 2005-2007
GDPPC 2108 2022 312 23444 2997
GDPGR 0.0083 0.08 -0.56 0.78 0.0235
PUB/GDP 7.08 3.77 0.1 20.36 7.17
PRI/GDPa 11.48 8.67 0.05 112.35 13.45
POPGRb 0.0269 0.01 -0.083 0.1 0.024
Note: GDPPC - GDP per capita (PPP); GDPGR - GDP per capita Growth rate; PUB/GDP -
Public investment/GDP; PRI/GDP - Private investment/GDP; POPGR - Population growth rate.
aA very high value of private investment corresponds to a high value of growth; but for public
investment this is not the case.
bThe minimum and maximum values are for Rwanda in 1993 and 1998, respectively.
Source: The data for GDP per-capita are obtained from the PWT 6.3 (Heston et al., 2009)
while the data for the public and private investment variables are extracted from the African
Development Indicators (World Bank, 2010). Population data are from World Bank (2010). Only
xed capital investment by governments and non-nancial public enterprises are included here for
public investment.
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Table 2
Estimation results
Regressors Separatea WLS SUR Simultaneousb
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Equation I: Dependent variable: Log(GDPPC)
Log(GDPPC) (L1) 0.942 0.984 0.991 0.962
(47.1) (220.4) (269.5) (39.71)
Log(PUB/GDP) 0.098 0.063 0.062 0.093
(7.06) (15.6) (17.7) (6.03)
Log(PRI/GDP) 0.029 0.023 0.019 0.035
(2.04)* (5.95) (6.08) (2.82)
POPGR2 -22.5 -11.7 -7.8 -25.04
-(8.5) -(3.0) (-2.36)* -(3.01)
Time 0.00082 0.00078 0.00084 0.00089
(1.65)** (3.21) (4.14) (1.71)**
Equation II: Dependent variable: Log(PRI/GDP)
Log(PRI/GDP) (L1) 0.643 0.586 0.686 0.679
(16.1) (29.1) (36.0) (15.36)
Log(PUB/GDP) (L2) -0.125 -0.150 -0.126 -0.182
-(3.45) -(6.69) -(5.79) -(3.67)
Log(GDPGR) (L1) 0.286 0.264 0.273 0.429
(1.70)** (2.28)* (2.35)* (1.81)**
Log(PRI/GDP) (L2)
Log(PUB/GDP) (L1) 0.057 0.091 0.073 0.106
(4.2) (10.1) (8.1) (3.49)
Equation III: Dependent variable: Log(PUB/GDP)
Log(PUB/GDP) (L1) 0.382 0.384 0.559 0.266
(4.5) (9.9) (15.6) (2.83)
Log(PRI/GDP) (L2)
Log(PUB/GDP) (L1) 0.163 0.154 0.113 0.172
(4.2) (8.7) (6.9) (4.81)
Log(PRI/GDP) (L1) 0.119 0.132 0.132 0.158
(3.3) (5.6) (5.4) (3.21)
Log(PRI/GDP) (L2) -0.383 -0.399 -0.327 -0.382
-(4.9) -(11.2) -(9.4) -(4.88)
GDPGR (L2) 0.337 0.372 0.385 0.422
(2.19)* (3.3) (3.3) (2.37)*
Equation IV: Dependent variable: POPGRc
POPGR (L1) 2.658 2.607 2.607 2.620
(97.5) (132.1) (132.1) (43.19)
POPGR (L2) -2.707 -2.561 -2.561 -2.559
-(46.4) -(66.5) -(66.5) -(21.06)
POPGR (L3) 1.059 0.950 0.950 0.936
(28.7) (42.4) (42.4) (14.10)
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Table 2 (continued)
POPGR (L7) -0.118 -0.039 -0.039 -0.031
-(7.7) -(10.1) -(10.1) -(4.77)
POPGR (L8) 0.066 0.003 0.003 0.002
(5.5) (3.0) (3.0) (2.11)*
LOG(GDPPC) (L2) -0.0009 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
-(2.6) -(3.0) -(3.0) -(1.48)***
LOG(GDPPC) (L3) 0.0017 0.002 0.002 0.001
(3.8) (4.1) (4.1) (1.6)**
LOG(GDPPC) (L5) -0.0009 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(-3.257) -(3.6) -(3.5) -(1.67)**
Period d 1966-2008 1966-2008 1967-2008
Observation e 1314 1314 1312
J-statistics f - - 0.0203
Sargan p-value g - - 0.27
2nd order serial correlation h - - i
Note: See Table 1 for variables denition. L(1) and L(2) show that the 1st and the 2nd lag of the
indicated variable are used, respectively. t-values are in parentheses. All coe¢ cients are signicant
at the 1% level except asterisked entries: *, ** and *** indicate signicance at the 5%, the 10% and
the 14% (in one case), respectively. In the rst-di¤erence version of System GMM, the J-statistics
and the number of instruments are divided by the number of observations. The J-statistic is the
quadratic form minimized by GMM. Columns (3) and (4) look identical for equation IV due to
rounding.
aEquations are estimated separately; System GMM estimator (in its rst di¤erence variant) is
used for equation I; System GMM estimator (in its orthogonal deviation variant) for equations II
and III; xed e¤ects for equation IV.
bA system of simultaneous equations is estimated; for the rst three equations, System GMM
estimator (in its rst di¤erence variant) is applied; GMM-HAC: Kernel: Quadratic, Bandwidth:
Variable Newey-West (10), No prewhitening. For the fourth equation, xed e¤ects is applied.
cThe population growth regression (column 1) has an intercept of 0.002.
Separate estimation Equation I Equation II Equation III Equation IV
Periodd 1967-2007 1968-2008 1968-2008 1969-2008
Observatione 733 710 722 1308
J-statisticsf 0.014 173.18 173.19 -
Instruments 17 115 152 -
Sargan p-valueg 0.27 0.034 0.069 -
2nd order serial correlationh -0.127 0.085 -0.054 -
(t-value) (-3.23) (-1.89) -(1.14) -
2nd order serial correlationi -0.127 -0.123 0.002 -0.095
(t-value) (-3.23) (-3.20) (0.045) (-3.09)
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Figure 1. Benchmark simulation, 1960 to 2900
Note: See Table 1 for variables denition. Coe¢ cients estimates from the simultaneous equation
estimations of column 4, Table 2, are used.
Figure 2a. The e¤ect of a de-stabilizing public investment shock on growth rate relative to the
benchmark
Note: Under the smallest de-stabilizing shock of public investment GDP share of 1.8%, output
implodes after 2500.
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Figure 2b. The e¤ect of a de-stablizing public investment shock on investments
Note: Under the smallest de-stabilizing shock of public investment GDP share of 1.8% , investments
explode after 2500.
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Figure 3a. The e¤ect of a non de-stabilizing shock relative to the benchmark
Note: See Table 1 and 3 for variables denition. Under the largest non de-stabilizing shock of public
investment GDP share (1.79%), output, net income and consumpiton per capita increase by more
than 30 percent after a certain transition period; population growth rates decrease slightly.
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Figure 3b. The e¤ect of a non de-stabilizing shock on investments relative to the benchmark
Note: Under the largest non de-stabilizing shock of public investment GDP share (1.79%) in 2015,
investments increase by more than 20 percent after a certain transition period.
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Figure 4. E¤ects of raising public investment GDP share to 11% the optimal value under the
simultaneous equations estimation
Note: When raising the public investment GDP share to 11%,  the value which maximizes the
net present value of consumption (at 4% discount rate) when using coe¢ cient estimates from the
simultaneous equation estimation of columns 4 of Table 2, from its benchmark values, population
growth rates decline, growth rates return to the baseline value after more than hundred years, and
all other variables increase by 40% to 80%.
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Figure 5. E¤ects of raising public investment to 9.12%  the optimal value under the separate
equations estimation
Note: When raising the public investment GDP share to 9.12%, the value which maximizes the
net present value of consumption at (4% discount rate) when using coe¢ cient estimates from the
separate equation estimation of columns 1 of Table 2,  from its benchmark values, population
growth rates are lower, public investment shares increase by more than 20%, growth rates return
to the baseline value after more than hundred years, and all other variables increase by only less
than 10%.
B. Technical appendix (not for publication)
This section demonstrates the formulation of the separate and simultaneous equations
estimations conducted in Section 3. It also provides the instruments used for each equations under
both methods. Four estimation equations are used: the growth equation, the public investment
equation, the private investment equation and the population growth equations.
B.1. The simultaneous equation system
For the simultaneous equations estimation, we set up a system in which we write each of the
first three equations as a System GMM estimator model (due to limited sample sizes in the time
dimension as mentioned earlier). Each equation is written twice, once in first differences and then
in levels with sample means subtracted (within-groups estimator). For the population growth
equation, however, we have enough observations in the time dimension. Therefore we enter it only
as a within-groups estimator, using lagged levels as instruments.
Thus, the first difference and the level equations related to the growth equation (26) are,
respectively,
? lny it ? a1?? lny it?1 ? ? ?1 ? ???? ln?1 ? ?sg/y? it ??
? ??? ln?sg/y? it ? ? a2 ? ln?s
k/y? it?1
? a3 ???p ? it
2 ? a4??? t ? ? ?u it (B1)
and
lny it ? a1lny it?1 ? ?1 ? ??ln?1 ? ?sg/y? it ?
? ?ln?sg/y? it ? a2ln?s
k/y? it?1
? a3??p ? it
2 ? a4? t ? u it (B2)
where ? lnx it ? lnx it ? lnx it?1; lnx it ? lnx it ? lnx it; and, lnx it is the average of each country’s
variables over time.
In relation to the private investment equation (27), the first difference and the level equations
are, respectively,
? ln?sk/y? it ? b1 ? ln?s
k/y? it?1 ? b2?? ln?s
g/y? it?2 ? ? b3???y ? it?1
? b4 ? ln?sk/y? it?2 ? ln?s
g/y? it?1 ? ?u it (B3)
and
ln?sk/y? it ? b1ln?s
k/y? it?1 ? b2ln?s
g/y? it?2 ? b3??y ? it?1
? b4ln?sk/y? it?2 ? ln?s
g/y? it?1 ? u it (B4)
with respect to to the public investment equation (28),
? ln?sg/y? it ? c1?? ln?s
g/y? it?1 ? ? c2 ? ln?s
k/y? it?1
? c3 ? ln?sk/y? it?2 ? c4????y ? it?2 ?
? c5 ? ln?sk/y? it?2 ? ln?s
g/y? it?1 ? ?u it (B5)
and
ln?sg/y? it ? c1ln?s
g/y? it?1 ? c2ln?s
k/y? it?1
? c3ln?sk/y? it?2 ? c4??y ? it?2
? c5ln?sk/y? it?2 ? ln?s
g/y? it?1 ? u it (B6)
The within groups estimator related to the population growth equation (29) is
??p ? it ? d1??p ? it?1 ? d2??p ? it?2 ? d3??p ? it?3
? d4??p ? it?7 ? d5??p ? it?8 ? d6lny it?2
? d7lny it?3 ? d8lny it?5 ? u it (B7)
The instruments used for each of the above equations are a constant and the following (A
double index indicates the first and the last lag used as an instrument).:
(B1): lny it?2, ln?1 ? ?sg/y? it?1 ?, ln?sg/y? it?1, ln?sk/y? it?1, ??p ? it?1
2 , ? t
(B2): ? lny it?2, it?4, ? ln?1 ? ?sg/y? it?1 ?, ? ln?sg/y? it?1, ? ln?sk/y? it?1, ???p ? it
2
(B3): ln?sk/y? it?2, ln?s
g/y? it?2, ??y ? it?1, ln?s
k/y? it?2 ? ln?s
g/y? it?1, c
(B4): ? ln?sk/y? it?2,it?4, ? ln?1 ? ?s
g/y? it?2 ?,???y ? it?3, ? ln?s
k/y? it?3 ? ln?s
g/y? it?2
(B5): ln?sg/y? it?2, ln?s
k/y? it?2,it?3, ??y ? it?2, ln?s
k/y? it?3 ? ln?s
g/y? it?2
(B6): ? ln?1 ? ?sg/y? it?2 ?, ? ln?sk/y? it?3, ???y ? it?2, ? ln?s
k/y? it?3 ? ln?s
g/y? it?2
(B7): ??p ? it?2,??p ? it?3, ??p ? it?4, ??p ? it?7, ??p ? it?8, lny it?2, lny it?3, lny it?5
B.2. Separate estimation
For the separate equation estimations, both first difference and the Arellano-Bover (1995)
orthogonal deviation methods are applied. The latter is applied to the investment equations. But,
similar to the simultaneous estimation, first difference is used for the growth equation while fixed
effects is applied to the population growth equation. The growth equations in the separate equations
estimation are therefore similar to (B1) and (B2) whereas the population growth equation is similar
to (B7).
The instruments used for each of the equations in the separate estimation method are a constant
and the following:
(B1): lny it?2, ln?1 ? ?sg/y? it?1 ?, ln?sg/y? it?1, ln?sk/y? it?2, ??p ? it?2
2 , ? t
(B2): ??y ? it?2, ? ln?1 ? ?sg/y? it?1 ?, ? ln?sg/y? it?1, ? ln?sk/y? it?2, ???p ? it?3
2
Private investment equation: ln?sk/y? it?2,t?3, ln?s
g/y? it?2,t?3, ??y ? it?1, ln?s
k/y? it?2 ? ln?s
g/y? it?1
Public investment equation: ln?sg/y? it?2,t?3, ln?s
k/y? it?2,t?3, ??y ? it?2, ln?s
k/y? it?2 ? ln?s
g/y? it?1
A double index indicates again the first and the last lag used as an instrument.
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